

Optimal market dealing under constraints

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Motivations : Liquidity costs for price takers

- ▶ Price takers trade only through market orders and pay liquidity costs
 - Transaction costs due to bid-ask spread :
 - Shreve and Soner (1994) ; Korn (1998) ; Framstad, Oksendal and Sulem (2001),...
 - Price impact for large trades : Almgren and Chriss (2001)
 - Supply curves : Cetin, Jarrow, Protter (2004) ; Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied (2010),...
 - Impact functions : Bank and Baum (2004) ; Ly Vath, Mnif and Pham (2007) ; Kharroubi, Pham (2010) ; Roch (2011)...

Motivations : Liquidity in limit order book market

- ▶ Trade in a limit order book through market and limit order
 - pay less liquidity costs but have some inventory risk.
 - order-driven market (NYSE,...)
- Liquidation problems :
 - Guéant, Lehalle and Tapia (2012) ; Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2012) ; Bouchard, Lehalle and Dang (2011) ;...
- Market making/Portfolio management problems :
 - Guilbaud and Pham (2013) ; C., Ly Vath, Roch and Scotti (2015) ;...

Motivations : Market dealing under constraints

- ▶ trade in a dealer market
 - face liquidity and inventory constraints.
 - quote driven market (Nasdaq, LSE,...)
 - competition with others dealers or act as a single/representative dealer
- ▶ A market dealer faces some constraints
 - Provide liquidity
 - Set "reasonable" prices and spread
 - Cash and stock holdings constraints

- ▶ Ho, Stoll (1981) ; Mildestein and Schleef (1983) ; Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) ;...

- 1 Model and problem formulation
 - Non controlled model
 - Controlled model
 - An optimal control problem with regime switching
- 2 Analytical properties and dynamic programming principle
 - Properties of the value functions
 - Dynamic programming principle
- 3 Viscosity characterization of the objective function
- 4 Numerical illustrations

Non controlled model

► We consider a probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ with a filtration $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ satisfying the usual conditions.


► Let two Cox processes N^a and N^b with intensity processes are defined by two processes $(\lambda_t^a)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ and $(\lambda_t^b)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$.

We define θ_i^a (resp. θ_i^b) as the i^{th} jump time of N^a (resp. N^b), which corresponds to the i^{th} buy (resp. sell) market order.

► **Mid price process** : For all $i \in \mathbb{N}^*$, the dynamics of the process P is given by

$$\begin{cases} dP_t = 0, & \text{for } \xi_i < t < \xi_{i+1} \\ P_{\theta_i^b} = P_{\theta_i^b-} - \delta \\ P_{\theta_i^a} = P_{\theta_i^a-} + \delta \end{cases}$$

Representation of non controlled prices dynamics



Limit price process

- **Intensities** : We assume that $\lambda_t^a = \lambda^a(t, P_{t-})$ and $\lambda_t^b = \lambda^b(t, P_{t-})$ where λ^a and λ^b are deterministic functions.
- **Mid price infinitesimal generator** : For $f \in \mathcal{C}^2(\mathbb{R})$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} Lf(t, p) &= \lambda^a(t, p) (f(p + \delta) - f(p)) + \lambda^b(t, p) (f(p - \delta) - f(p)) . \\ &= \delta \left(\lambda^a - \lambda^b \right) (t, p) f'(p) + \frac{\delta^2}{2} \left(\lambda^a + \lambda^b \right) (t, p) f''(p) + o(\delta^2). \end{aligned}$$

- **Limit process** : Under the following assumption :

$$\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \delta \left(\lambda^a - \lambda^b \right) (t, p) = \mu(t, p) \text{ and } \lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \left(\lambda^a + \lambda^b \right) (t, p) = \sigma(t, p)^2,$$

the laws of the process P converges weakly to the law of the diffusion process with coefficients μ and σ


Market making strategies

- ▶ We consider a probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ with a filtration $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}$ satisfying the usual conditions.

- ▶ When the i^{th} buying (resp. selling) order arrives at the \mathbb{F} -stopping time θ_i^a (resp. θ_i^b) :
 - **Provide liquidity** : The market maker has to sell (resp. buy) an asset at the ask (resp. bid) price denoted by P^a (resp. P^b).
 - **Set Bid and Ask prices** : The market maker may either keep the bid and ask prices constant or increase (resp. decrease) one or both of them by some ticks (δ).

- ▶ We consider a control $\alpha := (\epsilon_t^a, \epsilon_t^b, \eta_t^a, \eta_t^b)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ \mathbb{F} -predictable process where the random variables $\epsilon_t^a, \epsilon_t^b, \eta_t^a, \eta_t^b$ are valued in $\{-\chi_{min}, \dots, \chi_{max}\}$.

Representation of a market making strategies



Prices and spread dynamics

- **Bid and Ask processes** : For $c \in \{a, b\}$, the dynamics of P^c evolves according to the following equations

$$\text{for } i \in \mathbb{N}^*, \quad \begin{cases} dP_t^c &= 0 \\ P_{\theta_i^b}^c &= P_{\theta_i^{b-}}^c - \delta \epsilon_{\theta_i^b}^c \\ P_{\theta_i^a}^c &= P_{\theta_i^{a-}}^c + \delta \eta_{\theta_i^a}^c, \end{cases} \quad \text{for } \xi_i < t < \xi_{i+1}$$

where $(\xi_i)_{i \geq 0}$ is the sequence of transaction times.

- **Mid price and spread processes** : We set $P := \frac{P^a + P^b}{2}$ and $S := P^a - P^b$. For all $i \in \mathbb{N}^*$, the dynamics of the process (P, S) is given by

$$\begin{cases} dP_t = 0, & \text{for } \xi_i < t < \xi_{i+1} \\ P_{\theta_i^b} = P_{\theta_i^{b-}} - \frac{\delta}{2} (\epsilon_{\theta_i^b}^a + \epsilon_{\theta_i^b}^b) \\ P_{\theta_i^a} = P_{\theta_i^{a-}} + \frac{\delta}{2} (\eta_{\theta_i^a}^a + \eta_{\theta_i^a}^b). \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{cases} dS_t = 0, & \text{for } \xi_i < t < \xi_{i+1} \\ S_{\theta_i^b} = S_{\theta_i^{b-}} - \delta (\epsilon_{\theta_i^b}^a - \epsilon_{\theta_i^b}^b) \\ S_{\theta_i^a} = S_{\theta_i^{a-}} + \delta (\eta_{\theta_i^a}^a - \eta_{\theta_i^a}^b). \end{cases}$$

Cash and stock holdings dynamics

- **Cash holdings** : We denote by $r > 0$ the instantaneous interest rate. The bank account evolves according to the following equations

$$\text{for } i \in \mathbb{N}^*, \quad \begin{cases} dX_t &= rX_t dt, \\ X_{\theta_i^b} &= X_{\theta_i^{b-}} - P_{\theta_i^b}^b, \\ X_{\theta_i^a} &= X_{\theta_i^{a-}} + P_{\theta_i^a}^a, \end{cases} \quad \text{for } \xi_i < t < \xi_{i+1},$$

- **Stock holdings** : The number of shares held by the market maker at time $t \in [0, T]$ is denoted by Y_t , and evolves according to the following equations

$$\text{for } i \in \mathbb{N}^*, \quad \begin{cases} dY_t &= 0, \\ Y_{\theta_i^b} &= Y_{\theta_i^{b-}} + 1 \\ Y_{\theta_i^a} &= Y_{\theta_i^{a-}} - 1 \end{cases} \quad \text{for } \xi_i < t < \xi_{i+1}$$

Regime switching

- **Liquidity regimes :**

Let L be a continuous time, time homogeneous, irreducible Markov chain with m states.

The generator of the chain L under \mathbb{P} is denoted by $A = (\vartheta_{i,j})_{i,j=1,\dots,m}$. Here $\vartheta_{i,j}$ is the constant intensity of transition of the chain L from state i to state j .

- **Market orders arrivals :** Let two Cox processes N^a and N^b .

The intensity processes associated with N^a and N^b are defined, for $t \geq 0$, by $\lambda^a(t, l_t, P_t, S_t)$ and $\lambda^b(t, l_t, P_t, S_t)$ where λ^a and λ^b are positive deterministic functions, bounded and defined on $[0, T] \times \{1, \dots, m\} \times \frac{\delta}{2}\mathbb{N} \times \delta\mathbb{N}$.

We define θ_i^a (resp. θ_i^b) as the i^{th} jump time of N^a (resp. N^b), which corresponds to the i^{th} buy (resp. sell) market order.

Admissible strategies

- **Liquidity constraints** : Let $K > 0$, the market maker has to use controls such that

$$P_t - S_t/2 > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad 0 < S_t \leq K \times \delta, \quad \text{for } 0 \leq t \leq T.$$

- **Inventory and cash constraints** : Let $x_{min} < 0$ and $y_{min} \leq y_{max}$. We introduce the following notations :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{S} &= (x_{min}, +\infty) \times \{y_{min}, \dots, y_{max}\} \times \frac{\delta}{2} \mathbb{N} \times \delta \{1, \dots, K\}, \\ \mathcal{S} &= \{(t, x, y, p, s) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{S} : p - \frac{s}{2} \geq \delta\}. \end{aligned}$$

For a control α , we define the liquidation time :

$$\tau^{t,i,z,\alpha} := \inf\{u \geq t : X_u^{t,i,x,\alpha} \leq x_{min} \text{ or } Y_u^{t,i,y,\alpha} \in \{y_{min} - 1, y_{max} + 1\}\}$$

- **Admissible strategies** : Let $(t, z) := (t, x, y, p, s) \in \mathcal{S}$, the strategy $\alpha = (\epsilon_u^a, \epsilon_u^b, \eta_u^a, \eta_u^b)_{t \leq u \leq T}$ is admissible, if the processes $\epsilon^a, \epsilon^b, \eta^a, \eta^b$ are valued in $\{-\chi_{min}, \dots, \chi_{max}\}$ and for all $u \in [t, T]$, $(u, Z_{u-}^{t,i,z,\alpha}) \in \mathcal{S}$. We denote by $\mathcal{A}(t, z)$ the set of all these admissible policies.

Objective function

- **Portfolio liquidation** : If the market maker decides (or has) to liquidate her portfolio, then she actually gets

$$yQ(t, y, p, s) = y(p - \text{sign}(y)\frac{s}{2})f(t, y),$$

where $f : [0, T] \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$, non-linear in y and such that

$$f(t, y) \leq f(t, y') \text{ if } y' \leq y \text{ and } yf(t', y) \leq yf(t, y) \text{ if } t' \leq t.$$

- **Utility and penalty functions** : Let $\gamma > 0$ and $U(x) = 1 - e^{-\gamma x}$ on \mathbb{R} . We set

$$U_L = U \circ L \quad \text{where } L(t, x, y, p, s) = x + yQ(t, y, p, s).$$

Let g a bounded positive function defined on $\{y_{min}, \dots, y_{max}\}$.

- **Objective function** : We consider the functions $(v_i)_{i \in \{1, \dots, m\}}$ defined on S by

$$v_i(t, z) := \sup_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}(t, z)} J_i^\alpha(t, z)$$

where we have set

$$J_i^\alpha(t, z) := \mathbb{E} \left[U_L(T \wedge \tau^{t, i, z, \alpha}, Z_{(T \wedge \tau^{t, i, z, \alpha})-}^{t, i, z, \alpha}) - \int_t^{T \wedge \tau^{t, i, z, \alpha}} g(Y_s^{t, i, y, \alpha}) ds \right].$$

Analytical properties and dynamic programming principle

- Model and problem formulation
- **Analytical properties and dynamic programming principle**
- Viscosity characterization of the objective function
- Numerical illustrations

Objective functions bounds

► Let $(t, z) := (t, x, y, p, s) \in S$. From monotonicity of f ,

$$L(t, z) \geq x_{\min} + y_{\min} f(0, y_{\min})(p - \frac{K\delta}{2}).$$

Proposition

There exist C_1 , C_2 and C_3 positive constants such that

$$1 - C_1 - C_2 e^{C_3 p} \leq v_i(t, z) \leq 1, \quad \forall (i, t, z) := (i, t, x, y, p, s) \in \{1, \dots, m\} \times S,$$

Uniform continuity of the objective functions

Hölder continuity of the criteria functions

Let $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, $(t, z) := (t, x, y, p, s) \in \bar{S}$ and (t', x') in $[0, T] \times (x_{min}, +\infty)$.

For all $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}(t \wedge t', z)$ such that $\alpha_{\llbracket t \wedge t', t \vee t' \rrbracket} = 0$, we have $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}(t, z) \cap \mathcal{A}(t', z')$ with $z' = (x', y, p, s)$ and, if (t', x') is close enough to (t, x) , then

$$|J_i^\alpha(t, z) - J_i^\alpha(t', z')| \leq K_2(p) \left(\psi(re^{rT} |x'(t-t')|) + \psi(x' - x) + |t' - t| \right).$$

where $K_2(p) > 0$ and ψ an Hölder continuous function on \mathbb{R} .

Uniform continuity of the objective functions

Let $(i, y, p, s) \in \{1, \dots, m\} \times \{y_{min}, \dots, y_{max}\} \times \frac{\delta}{2} \mathbb{N}^* \times \delta \{1, \dots, K\}$ such that $p - \frac{s}{2} > 0$.

The function $(t, x) \rightarrow v_i(t, x, y, p, s)$ is uniformly continuous on $[0, T] \times [x_{min}, +\infty)$.

Dynamic programming principle

Dynamic programming principle

Let $(i, t, z) := (i, t, x, y, p, s) \in \{1, \dots, m\} \times S$. Let ν be a stopping time in $\mathcal{T}_{t, T}$, we have

$$v_i(t, z) = \sup_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}(t, z)} \mathbb{E} \left[v_{\nu \wedge \hat{\theta}} \left(\nu \wedge \hat{\theta}, Z_{\nu \wedge \hat{\theta}}^{t, i, z, \alpha} \right) \mathbf{1}_{\{\nu \wedge \hat{\theta} < \hat{\tau}^\alpha\}} \right. \\ \left. + U_L \left(\hat{\tau}^\alpha, x e^{r(\hat{\tau}^\alpha - t)}, y, p, s \right) \mathbf{1}_{\{\hat{\tau}^\alpha \leq \nu \wedge \hat{\theta}\}} - g(y) \left(\nu \wedge \hat{\theta} \wedge \hat{\tau}^\alpha - t \right) \right],$$

with $\hat{\tau}^\alpha = \tau^{t, i, z, \alpha} \wedge T$ and

$$\hat{\theta} = \inf \{ u \geq t : N_u > N_{u-} \text{ or } N_u^{a, i, t, z} > N_{u-}^{a, i, t, z} \text{ or } N_u^{b, i, t, z} > N_{u-}^{b, i, t, z} \}.$$

Analytical properties of the objective function and dynamic programming principle

- Model and problem formulation
- Analytical properties and dynamic programming principle
- **Viscosity characterization of the objective function**
- Numerical illustrations

HJB equation (1)

- **Set of admissible controls** : We define the following set :

$$A(t, z) := \{ \alpha = (\varepsilon^a, \varepsilon^b, \eta^a, \eta^b) \in \{0, 1\}^4 : \delta \varepsilon^b < p - \frac{s}{2}, \\ \delta \leq s - \delta(\varepsilon^a - \varepsilon^b) \leq K\delta \text{ and } \delta \leq s + \delta(\eta^a - \eta^b) \leq K\delta \}.$$

- **Transactions operators** : For all $(i, t, x, y, p, s) := (i, t, z) \in \{1, \dots, m\} \times \mathcal{S}$ and $\alpha := \{\varepsilon^a, \varepsilon^b, \eta^a, \eta^b\} \in A(t, z)$, we introduce the two operators :

$$Av_i(t, z, \alpha) = \begin{cases} U_L(t, x, y_{min}, p, s) & \text{if } y = y_{min}, \\ v_i(t, x + p + \frac{s}{2}, y - 1, p + \frac{\delta}{2}(\eta^a + \eta^b), s + \delta(\eta^a - \eta^b)) & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

$$Bv_i(t, z, \alpha) = \begin{cases} U_L(t, x, y_{max}, p, s), & \text{if } y = y_{max} \\ U_L(t, z) & \text{if } x < x_{min} + p - \frac{s}{2} \text{ or } x = x_{min} + p - \frac{s}{2} < 0 \\ v_i(t, x - p + \frac{s}{2}, y + 1, p - \frac{\delta}{2}(\varepsilon^a + \varepsilon^b), s - \delta(\varepsilon^a - \varepsilon^b)) & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

HJB equation (2)

Let $(\varphi_i)_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ a family of smooth functions defined on \mathcal{S} . We introduce the following operator associated with state $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{H}_i(t, z, \varphi_i, \frac{\partial \varphi_i}{\partial x}) &= rx \frac{\partial \varphi_i}{\partial x} + \sum_{j \neq i} \gamma_{ij} (\varphi_j(t, x, y, p, s) - \varphi_i(t, x, y, p, s)) - g(y) \\ &+ \sup_{\alpha \in A(t, z)} [\lambda_i^a(t, p, s) (\mathcal{A}\varphi_i(t, x, y, p, s, \alpha) - \varphi_i(t, x, y, p, s)) \\ &+ \lambda_i^b(t, p, s) (\mathcal{B}\varphi_i(t, x, y, p, s, \alpha) - \varphi_i(t, x, y, p, s))] = 0. \end{aligned}$$

We consider the HJB equation :

$$-\frac{\partial \varphi_i}{\partial t} - \mathcal{H}_i(t, z, \varphi_i, \frac{\partial \varphi_i}{\partial x}) = 0, \quad \text{for } (t, z) \in \mathcal{S}, \quad (1)$$

with the following boundary and terminal conditions :

$$v_i(t, x_{min}, y, p, s) = U_L(t, x_{min}, y, p, s) \quad (2)$$

$$v_i(T, x, y, p, s) = U_L(T, x, y, p, s) \quad (3)$$

Viscosity characterization of the objective function

Theorem :

The family of objective functions $(v_i)_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ is the unique family of functions such that

i) Continuity condition : For all

$(i, y, p, s) \in \{1, \dots, m\} \times \{y_{min}, \dots, y_{max}\} \times \frac{\delta}{2}\mathbb{N} \times \delta\{1, \dots, K\}$, $(t, x) \rightarrow v_i(t, x, y, p, s)$
is continuous on $\{(t, x) \in [0, T) \times [x_{min}, +\infty) : (t, x, y, p, s) \in \mathcal{S}\}$.

ii) Growth condition : There exists C_1, C_2 and C_3 positive constants such that

$$1 - C_1 - C_2 e^{C_3 p} \leq v_i(t, x, y, p, s) \leq 1, \quad \text{on } \{1, \dots, m\} \times \mathcal{S}.$$

iii) Boundary conditions :

$$v_i(t, x_{min}, y, p, s) = U_L(t, x_{min}, y, p, s) \text{ and } v_i(T, x, y, p, s) = U_L(T, x, y, p, s).$$

iv) Viscosity solution : $(v_i)_{1 \leq i \leq m}$ is a viscosity solution of the system of variational inequalities (1) on $\{1, \dots, m\} \times \mathcal{S}$.

Numerical illustrations

- Model and problem formulation
- Analytical properties and dynamic programming principle
- Viscosity characterization of the objective function
- **Numerical illustrations**

Numerical values

- Impact function :

$$f(t, y) = \exp(0.09y(T - t)).$$

- Intensity functions :

$$\lambda_i^a(p, s) = \frac{\psi_i^a}{p} \exp(-s - 0.01(p-1)) \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_i^b(p, s) = \psi_i^b p \exp(-s + 0.01(p-1)),$$

with $\psi_1^a = 120$, $\psi_2^a = 80$, $\psi_1^b = 80$, $\psi_2^b = 120$.

- Penalty and utility function :

$$g(y) = y^2 \times 10^{-3} \quad \text{and} \quad U(l) = 1 - e^{-\gamma l}.$$

Optimal strategy




FIGURE : *Optimal strategy when a sell market order arrives*

Optimal strategy





FIGURE : *Optimal strategy when a sell market order arrives*

Bid and ask price paths



A stock holdings path




FIGURE : A stock holdings path

Controlled vs random strategies




FIGURE : Mean of 100 paths of $L(t, Z_t)$

Thank you !